Today in the Geneva Observer:

Buying and Spending in a Country at War: How Has the UNHCR Been Performing in Ukraine? “Okay, but...” UN Auditors Say, Flagging a Few Problems

By Jamil Chade

In an effort at accountability and transparency, the UN decided to audit its own refugee agency, UNHCR. More specifically, it sought to determine whether the agency, while responding to one of its largest and most difficult missions, had put all the necessary safeguards in place to control how the massive amounts of cash were being doled out in Ukraine and surrounding countries, and if emergency material such as tents and health items were being properly procured, managed and distributed to its intended recipients.

Russia’s attack on February 24, 2022, had been as sudden as an earthquake or a hurricane, but the rapidly unfolding crisis that followed was of a different and unprecedented scale. Russia’s violent and sudden assault on its neighbor has created the largest refugee crisis in Europe since WWII. According to the UN’s own figure, as of May of this year, the conflict has displaced 13 million people within the country itself and sent a further 8 million Ukrainians onto the road, most of them scattered across Europe. And so, examining information from the very day of Russia’s attack to the end of 2022, the inspectors of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)—the investigators of the UN’s most secretive and impenetrable units­—pored over the refugee agency’s records documenting ‘cash-based interventions (CBI)’ in Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland and Moldova, and, in parallel, the delivery of emergency supplies, such as toilet kits, tents, and heaters to mitigate the effects of winter. With its investigations closed, OIOS published its findings in three reports released in September. 

Both on the ground and in Geneva, UNHCR had moved swiftly: on March 10, it established a “Cash Hub” in Geneva, in its HQ in the Quartier des Nations. Between March 10, 2022, and December 31, 2022, UNHCR ended up spending $448 million, assisting almost one and a half million people. With multiple agencies and partners providing cash assistance to those affected by the war, OIOS wanted to know if the refugee agency had set up a system that would flag duplicate payments to the beneficiaries. It had.

“UNHCR instituted deduplication measures to prevent and detect duplicate payments,” the audit reveals, noting that “the measures were largely successful.” OIOS, however, did identify duplicate payments, prompting it to write that UNHCR’s deduplication measures “need strengthening.”

The review of five operations revealed that UNHCR paid $2,231,477 to 2,505 households that had also received payments from other agencies. OIOS also identified 154 individuals that were registered in more than one UNHCR operation. According to OIOS’s investigators, “the total amount paid to these individuals across UNHCR operations was $114,158. […] While this amount represented only a small percentage of the overall assistance, it nonetheless signaled the existence of control weaknesses,” it concludes.

The same audit also revealed that information provided by the Ukrainian government sometimes lacked transparency, and greater data control was needed to ensure the proper identification of eligible people. However, the burden of strengthening controls, OIOS states, doesn’t fall on the Ukrainian government, but on UNHCR. The audit therefore recommends that UNHCR enhance its information systems—a recommendation that UNHCR says it has followed.

The Management of Non-Food Items

OIOS conducted a concurrent audit over the same period of time and in the same countries to assess if the management of what it labels ‘non-food items (NFI)’ was “adequate and effective in meeting the needs of the affected population.” The OIOS investigation reveals that “UNHCR procured and managed NFIs totaling $186 million between February and December 2022.” The refugee agency, the investigators write, “met the fundamental needs of displaced populations.” However, they press, UNHCR needs to “strengthen controls over NFIs distribution modalities, monitoring and reporting, inventory management, warehousing and procurement.”

For instance, OIOS inspectors found that a few donations circumvented UNHCR’s controls and that, in some cases, items distributed by the UN agency’s partners were missing proper documentation. The inspectors found “weaknesses in the monitoring and reporting of distributions performed by partners.” As an example, one partner reported that 1,240 individuals received hygiene packs/kits in October 2022, but the distribution lists reviewed by the auditors indicated that almost a quarter of the beneficiaries received only soap, and not complete hygiene kits.

“The shortcomings occurred due to ineffective monitoring and oversight,” the audit concludes. As a recommendation, “the UNHCR Representation in Ukraine should strengthen its monitoring of government entities and partners.”

According to the auditors, insufficient procedures and documentation resulted in people not receiving what they needed as fast as they needed, despite the availability of emergency items in warehouses. Tents worth $2.2 million were in stock in Moldova, Ukraine, and Hungary as of 19 May 2023, but only two percent of them were released. Items such as shampoo and deodorant valued at a total of $4.4 million were also piling up in warehouses for many weeks before being distributed. 

In its response to the auditors’ findings, UNHCR explained the delays as a result of the challenges of operating in a country at war with a high level of mobility among the internally displaced population. Substantial quantities of NFIs were also transferred from Moldova to the Turkey/Syrian border after it experienced a massive and devastating earthquake situation in February 2023, UNHCR added.

The auditors acknowledge the challenges, while maintaining that there is a need to “improve inventory management and warehousing control arrangements,” and writing that UNHCR should “design, implement and maintain control mechanisms in storing and accounting for NFIs in a transparent and accountable manner. 

The procurement of some NFIs such as mattresses and heaters also proved to be problematic at times. Significant advance payments were made to suppliers to secure the delivery of large quantities of items, which carried significant financial risk. In their answers to OIOS’s investigators, UNHCR justified their decision by explaining that “large quantities were required and suppliers could not bear the costs of raw materials.” The investigators disputed this however, noting from their meticulous forensic analysis that upfront payments had been made to suppliers who had said there would be no issues sourcing items. One supplier that received a 90 per cent advance payment had in fact stated in their offer that the relevant items were “available in significant quantities.”

Overall, the three OIOS audits conclude that UNHCR’s actions in Ukraine, Poland, Moldova and Slovakia met the agency’s standards and procedure—with a few important buts, which all required remedial actions. “The cash-based interventions were generally adequate,” the UN inspectors summarize in one report; the refugee agency should “address the root causes of the duplication of payments,” they admonish in the second; while the third states that “the management of non-food items was generally aligned with UNHCR’s rules with a some exceptions noted for improvements.”

If the auditors’ reports read like nitpicking bureaucratic minutiae couched in dry accounting lingo, it’s because that is exactly what they are. But these documents have a much broader political significance: Questions are often asked, not just by Member States but also by the public, about the efficiency of the humanitarian sector—especially in the context of ‘compassion fatigue,’ which is itself sometimes driven by such concerns. With this in mind, these reports show the reality of the action of a UN agency in the midst of a war, and its ability to deliver on a mandate. In this particular case, the audits can also be seen as much-needed confidence boosters.

 -JC, with PHM

Volker Türk's Inextinguishable Belief in Human Rights

By Philippe Mottaz

Yesterday, Wednesday, December 6, a few days short of the high-level celebration here in Geneva of the 75^th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in a world described as “unhinged” by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and grown even crazier since, with no end in sight to the war in Ukraine and with a war between Israel and Hamas that looks like an unstoppable descent into hell forcing us to revisit our ideas about humanity, good and evil, and with more than fifty conflicts raging around the world, Volker Türk came before the press in Geneva.

For all the reasons above, but mainly because of the approaching 75^th anniversary on December 10, over the last few months and weeks, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has been omnipresent in Geneva, speaking to a great number of different audiences, diplomats, civil society, students, and business people. On each and every occasion, shaping his message to resonate with the preoccupations of his audience, Volker Türk delivered an impassioned and powerful defense of human rights and of their foundational text, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In his softly-spoken but firm manner, that is what he did again yesterday. And again, what was striking was not so much what he said—which he had already said elsewhere—but how he framed his message, and, above all, his absolute belief in the necessity of human rights and their capacity to build a more just world.

“Given the pervasive conflicts and coups, climate change, and other crises, have human rights failed?” he asked rhetorically in his opening statement. No, was his answer, “It is the cynical disregard for human rights and the failure to respect and heed warnings on human rights that has got us here. The conflicts and crises stalking us today should be wake-up calls for the international community. A wake-up call that when human rights are violated or sidelined, conflicts erupt. A wake-up call that failure to respect human rights results in instability, suffering, more inequalities, and economic crises.” For many human rights observers, the strength of Türk’s compelling message stems from the fact that ever since he assumed his position a little more than a year ago, he has been unwavering in his pronouncements, never putting himself in the vulnerable position of compromising his positions and values, and always demonstrating the utmost courage in speaking the truth.

UN High Commissioners for Human Rights are, by definition, seen as people of high moral authority. But what sets Türk apart from his predecessors is what some describe as his “bottom-up approach” to human rights. Michele Bachelet, whom he succeeded, was all about politics—and, for many, never truly convincing in her role. She practiced great power diplomacy around human rights. Her predecessor, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, was a brilliant mind, never shying away from speaking truth to power, to naming and shaming. He was admired for it, but, in the end, within a UN system dominated by the major great powers, his stridency was his undoing, and the cause he cared about so much was no longer advancing. It suffered setbacks.

Officialdom, institutions, and governments almost disappear in Türk’s distinctive narrative, replaced instead by the voices of the people: “In just over a year as High Commissioner for Human Rights, I have met, during my travels, with people from numerous countries, across all continents, including those in the midst of major crises,” he started by telling us. “Across each and every country,” he went on, “I heard—and witnessed—the universal desire for human rights to be respected and protected. I heard it from young women in Khartoum taking to the streets to drum up participation in protest rallies demanding their voices be heard in Government. I heard it from a rights defender working on environmental rights in the marshes of southern Iraq. From Indigenous Peoples’ representatives in Ecuador, Canada, Norway and Sweden.”

We live in a somber moment, Türk admitted, but he also reminded us that “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was crafted with lessons drawn from two global wars, the Holocaust, atomic destruction, profound economic devastation, and generations of colonial exploitation, oppression, injustice, and bloodshed.” Again and again, he came back to the notion of universality: “I sometimes hear that the UDHR doesn’t apply ‘in our religion, or in our culture,’ and I say this is absolute nonsense because the declaration has been negotiated for years by all countries. The UDHR inspired the decolonization movement and the anti-apartheid movement and inspired freedom fighters all around the world, from LGBTQI+ to the fight against racism. We need to honor these achievements but also look at the failures and learn from them.”

With the tragedy of the Middle East on everybody’s mind—Türk has so far not been allowed into the Gaza Strip by the Israeli government, and given the growing rift between the UN and Israel, it is hard to believe that an invitation will be forthcoming—the UN Human Rights chief warned that given the current circumstances and the statements from both sides, “there is a heightened risk of atrocity crimes.” “Measures,” he urged, “need to be taken urgently—both by the parties concerned and by all States, particularly those with influence—to prevent any such crimes. The international community needs to insist with one voice on a ceasefire, immediately, on human rights and humanitarian grounds.”

Will he be heard? Will the UN Security Council, now seized by Antonio Guterres himself invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter, succeed in putting an end to the hostilities? No one knows. But, Türk told us, “At this somber moment in history, I look forward to next week’s high-level event marking the 75^th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—to take stock of where we are, how we got here, and what we can do to craft a better future for all human beings, no matter who, no matter where.” 

"This," is said, is a moment of deep reflection for all of us." 

-PHM

Thresholds of Dialogue with Hamas and Russia

By Daniel Warner

Should potential mediators negotiate with Hamas? At a recent dinner of eminent international lawyers, an animated difference of opinion arose about whether there should be negotiations with the organization. On the one side, people said Hamas was a terrorist group, beyond conversations after its heinous crimes on October 7. On the other side, it was pointed out that “if you’re part of the problem, you must be part of the solution.” No truce, cease-fire or humanitarian pause can happen without negotiations with Hamas. The conversation then turned to how various international organizations have dealt with Russia. Should they be suspended? How can international organizations treat them normally after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine?

Behind the obvious geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine war or the Israel-Palestinian conflict, there are thresholds of dialogue, both public and private. Should mediators keep talking to countries or groups who have egregiously violated accepted norms? The golden rule of diplomacy is “We agree to disagree.” But a precursor to that diplomatic maxim is the presence of more than one party at the table. The “we” is not singular. Negotiations don’t happen in a vacuum.

The war in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict represent quandaries of dialogue. The first human reaction to gross violations of accepted norms is to punish, not to negotiate. However, the international system has no army with which to punish violations of international law. The toolbox is very small. Sanctions are one form, perhaps the easiest. But sanctions close relationships. If country X sanctions country Y by stopping trade, for example, the interaction between the two countries becomes limited. As such, sanctions reduce or suspend dialogue.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, various sanctions were placed on the Russian Federation, as well as on certain Russian citizens. The first assumption was, and still is, that Russia and Russians should be punished. It was also assumed that sanctions would change Russia’s behavior. Since the Russian Federation could not be tried and put in prison—notwithstanding the warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for Vladimir Putin’s arrest—sanctions denied the country and some citizens their usual venues for transaction.

Besides sanctions or suspended membership from international organizations—such as the UN General Assembly’s suspension of Russia from the Human Rights Council—there have also been instances of boycotting Russia. For instance, at the recent ministerial meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Skopje, North Macedonia, five states—Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland—said they would not attend because the foreign minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, would be present.

The OSCE, formerly the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, was founded in 1975 explicitly to promote dialogue at the height of the Cold War. (It became the OSCE in 1994.) The organization has fostered dialogue and agreements between East and West on a wide range of issues, such as arms control, free and fair elections, and freedom of the press.

So the world’s largest regional organization (with 57 members), designed to encourage dialogue at the height of East-West tension, is now being boycotted by five pro-Western countries. Here are some of the boycotting countries’ stated reasons for not attending:

“[T]he presence of the Russian delegation at minister-level for the first time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine will only worsen the crisis into which Russia has driven the OSCE,” Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted.

“Lavrov's place is at a special tribunal, not at the OSCE table,” Estonian Minister Margus Tsakhna said about Lavrov’s invitation to the Skopje meeting.

“We just cannot ignore the fact that the Russian minister of foreign affairs will be present at the table of the organization that is supposed to build peace and security in Europe,” Polish Foreign Minister Szymon Szynkowski vel Sek told reporters.

The foreign ministers of the three Baltic countries issued a joint statement saying that Lavrov’s participation “risks legitimizing aggressor Russia as a rightful member of our community of free nations, trivializing the atrocious crimes Russia has been committing.”

The United States did not boycott the meeting, but it made its own form of boycott known. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was present, but did not meet with Lavrov. Responding to questions about a possible meeting with Lavrov, a State Department representative said, “We do not expect this.”

However, despite all the sanctions, suspensions, and boycotts trying to isolate the country, Russia’s behavior towards Ukraine has not changed. While organizations and other countries may feel morally justified in imposing sanctions, suspensions or boycotts, these acts have not had the desired effect. The invasion continues. Russian troops are still fighting inside Ukraine.

What about Hamas? If sanctions, suspensions and boycotts have not worked against Russia, what about designating an organization as “terrorist”, as Hamas has been, by Israel, the United States, the European Union, Britain and several other countries?

The “terrorist” label is highly contested. For more than 20 years, an anti-terrorism convention has been under discussion, but it has been blocked because there is no agreement on the definition of terrorism, no criteria to dictate whether a particular organization is a terrorist group or not. Equally, there are no criteria for a group to be off the list. The label is, therefore, a political decision.

(Until 2008, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress were still on the United States’ list of terrorists. This despite the fact that 1993 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk “for their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa.”)

Labeling a group “terrorist” poses enormous difficulties in terms of contacts and negotiations. Under the US Patriot Act of 2001 (officially “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”): “Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both, and if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”

The Supreme Court upheld the Patriot Act in a 2010 decision, Holder vs the Humanitarian Law Project. The decision further confirmed the illegality of “material support” to terrorist groups such as “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service and personnel” under the Patriot Act. The Court ruled that any assistance could “legitimize” the group and free up resources for terrorist activities. The Court’s decision had the potential for the law to be applied to any person or organization in contact with designated terrorist group, even if they were only teaching humanitarian law or how to negotiate a peace settlement. The terrorist label was meant to establish complete isolation.

Jimmy Carter, among others, criticized the law: “The ‘material support law’—which is aimed at putting an end to terrorism—actually threatens The Carter Center’s work and the work of many other peacemaking organizations that must interact directly with groups that have engaged in violence. The vague language of the law leaves us wondering if we will be prosecuted for our work to promote peace and freedom.”

In another example of the dangers of terrorist labeling, Switzerland is currently debating whether or not to apply the label to Hamas. What would this mean for the neutral country? Professor Riccardo Bocco of the Geneva Graduate Institute explained to Swissinfo how it would limit Switzerland’s role in future negotiations:

“Switzerland's previous engagement with Hamas, despite its global perception, allowed it to mediate previous conflicts and negotiations effectively due to its neutral stance. The shift towards declaring Hamas a terrorist organization contradicts Switzerland's historical neutrality and mediating role. It potentially hampers its capacity to navigate and mediate future regional conflicts and negotiations, such as releasing hostages or facilitating dialogues between conflicting parties.”  

While it is illegal in many countries to talk to a designated terrorist organization, surely Qatar and other mediators are negotiating with Hamas about hostage/prisoner exchanges as well as extending the pause. Where are representatives of those countries which have labeled Hamas a terrorist organization in the negotiations? The United States? Switzerland? Nowhere—at least publicly.

Sanctions, suspensions, and boycotts haven’t halted Russia’s assault on Ukraine; and nor will labeling Hamas a terrorist organization help negotiations on prisoner exchanges, humanitarian pauses or an eventual peace plan. “If you’re part of the problem, you’re part of the solution,” gets my vote.

-DW

Today's Briefing: Philippe Mottaz - Jamil Chade - Daniel Warner

Editorial assistance: David Jenny

Edited by: Dan Wheeler